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Abstract
Memory judgments can be based on accurate memory information or on decision bias (the tendency to report that an
event is part of episodic memory when one is in fact unsure). Event related potentials (ERP) correlates are important
research tools for elucidating the dynamics underlying memory judgments but so far have been established only for
investigations of accurate old/new discrimination. To identify the ERP correlates of bias, and observe how these interact
with ERP correlates of memory, we conducted three experiments that manipulated decision bias within participants via
instructions during recognition memory tests while their ERPs were recorded. In Experiment 1, the bias manipulation was
performed between blocks of trials (automatized bias) and compared to trial-by-trial shifts of bias in accord with an external
cue (flexibly controlled bias). In Experiment 2, the bias manipulation was performed at two different levels of accurate old/
new discrimination as the memory strength of old (studied) items was varied. In Experiment 3, the bias manipulation was
added to another, bottom-up driven manipulation of bias induced via familiarity. In the first two Experiments, and in the low
familiarity condition of Experiment 3, we found evidence of an early frontocentral ERP component at 320 ms poststimulus
(the FN320) that was sensitive to the manipulation of bias via instruction, with more negative amplitudes indexing more
liberal bias. By contrast, later during the trial (500–700 ms poststimulus), bias effects interacted with old/new effects across
all three experiments. Results suggest that the decision criterion is typically activated early during recognition memory trials,
and is integrated with retrieved memory signals and task-specific processing demands later during the trial. More generally,
the findings demonstrate how ERPs can help to specify the dynamics of recognition memory processes under top-down
and bottom-up controlled retrieval conditions.
Citation: Hill H, Windmann S (2014) Examining Event-Related Potential (ERP) Correlates of Decision Bias in Recognition Memory Judgments. PLoS ONE 9(9):
e106411. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411
Editor: Alexandra Key, Vanderbilt University, United States of America
Received February 25, 2014; Accepted August 6, 2014; Published September 29, 2014
Copyright:  2014 Hill, Windmann. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: Research reported in this article was supported by a grant to SW of the German Research Foundation (DFG, funding no. WI-1582/3-1) www.dfg.de. The
authors acknowledge support for publishing this article by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and Open Access Publishing Fund of Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* Email: holger.hill@kit.edu
Introduction
Reports about past events and experiences not only rely on
accurate retrieval of stored information in memory, but also on
subjective decision-making processes, also called response biases.
The latter play a role especially when the memory trace is weak or
retrieval is difficult so that individuals are unsure, but need to
report nonetheless as in forced choice situations. Signal-detection
theory and nonparametric decision models [1–6] have provided
memory researchers with mathematical tools to statistically
separate accurate memory (sensitivity) from decision bias by
analyzing behavioral response rates observed in laboratory
experiments.
A growing number of experimental studies have shown that
variation in memory decision bias is not merely a nuisance
variable that needs to be controlled for, but may itself contain
important information about cognitive states, processes, and even
traits [7–9]. For instance, shifts in decision bias have been shown
to vary in accord with participants’ goal motivations and emotions
[10–13]. Seemingly paradoxically, even illusory memories can be
reflected in measures of decision bias [14,15].
Separating memory from decision bias acccording to
behavioral models
Some of the findings on the functions of response bias depend
on the appropriateness of assumptions made by the underlying
statistical model, often leading to heated debates about the valid
interpretation of the behavioral data [16–25]. Two classes of
models for simple old/new recognition memory tasks are depicted
in Figure 1. Signal Detection Theory (SDT), presumes that
items in a recognition memory test elicit a feeling of familiarity that
corresponds with the item’s position on a continuous memory
strength dimension. The mean familiarity signal is higher for
studied items than for unstudied items while being normally
distributed for both item types due to random variation. This
mean difference in familiarity between studied and unstudied
items reflects accurate old/new recognition (or d9 for ‘‘discrimi-
nation’’, [2]). However, to the degree that the two item
distributions overlap, accurate old/new discrimination is not
possible, so that participants need to guess depending on a decision
threshold. This threshold (c for criterion, [2]) is defined as the
point on the memory strength dimension above which participants
respond ‘‘old’’ and below which they respond ‘‘new’’. The decision
criterion is presumed to be independent of old/new discrimina-
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tion, but the two parameters are unreliable and can appear
correlated when the two item distributions are not normal.
Alternative estimates of bias and accuracy have therefore been
proposed that do not make distributional assumptions [4,26].
The second class of models consists of discrete state models, of
which the most well-known variant, the two-high threshold
model (2 HTM), is depicted in Figure 1. The model postulates
the following decision tree: When an old (studied) test item is
presented, the item is correctly recognized (i.e., it surpasses the
threshold for old recognition) with a probability of Pr (for
‘‘probability of recognition’’, [26]), in which case a correct ‘‘old’’
response is given (hit). When a new item is presented, it is correctly
recognized with the same probability Pr (surpassing the threshold
for new item recognition), in which case a correct ‘‘new’’ response
is rendered (correct rejection). However, if the old/new status of a
test item is not recognized (probability (1-Pr)), the system is in a
state of uncertainty and can only guess. With the (conditional)
probability of response bias Br, an ‘‘old’’ response is rendered, and
with the complementary (conditional) probability of (1 – Br), a
‘‘new’’ response is entered on the basis of guessing. Hence, Br
quantifies the probability to guess ‘‘old’’ when recognition memory
fails.
Some researchers have found the continuous SDT more
appropriate than discrete state models [22,27], while others find
the opposite [21,23], and yet others find agreement between the
two [28]. To advance such theoretical discussions, it would be
valuable to have an index of decision bias in memory research that
is not statistically extracted from behavioral response rates, but
more directly observed from the underlying brain processes.
Event-related potentials (ERPs) are ideal candidates to that end for
their sensitivity to cognitive processes and their high temporal
resolution.
Figure 1. In Signal Detection Theory (SDT), studied (old) items elicit a higher feeling of familiarity relative to unstudied (new) items,
both with a normal distribution. The mean familiarity difference between the old and new item distributions reflects recognition memory (old/
new discrimination performance, or d9). By contrast, the point on the familiarity dimension above which ‘‘old’’ responses are rendered and below
which ‘‘new’’ responses are rendered reflects the decision criterion (or response bias, c). More items with relatively low familiarity are contained in the
Hit response category (blue area) when the threshold is liberal as compared to conservative; the same is true for Correct Rejections (red area). In the
Two High Threshold Model (2 HTM), Hit Rates (HR) reflect the probability that an old item is either correctly recognized (Pr), or not (1 - Pr) while
there is a bias to respond ‘‘old’’ (Br). This is mathematically formulated as: [1] HR= Pr+(1 - Pr) Br. On the other hand, False Alarm Rates (FAR) reflect the
probability that a new item is not recognized (1 - Pr) while there is a bias to respond ‘‘old’’ (Br), mathematically formulated as: [2] FAR= (1 - Pr) Br.
Using [2] to resolve Pr in [1] yields: HR= Pr+FAR, equivalent to Pr=HR – FAR. Rewriting [2] yields Br= FAR/(1 - Pr). Since recognition thresholds for old
and new items are assumed to be equal, Pr and Br can be computed analogously from Correct Rejection Rates and Miss Rates. Thick lines in the
decision tree depict different response tendencies under conditions of relatively liberal (high Br) as opposed to conservative (low Br) decision criteria.
For both models, SDT and 2 HT, if accurate old/new discrimination is equal, changes in Hits, Correct Rejections, or any response types, can only
stem from bias, whether these are changes in response rates, confidence ratings, or associated brain measures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g001
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Using ERPs to investigate decision bias in memory
judgments
Researchers have long used ERPs to elucidate and analyze the
various cognitive processes involved in recognition memory (as
reviewed, e.g., by refs [29–33]). The typical and highly robust
finding is that old (studied) test items elicit more positive going
waveforms relative to new (unstudied) test items. Abundant
research has documented these ERP old/new differences, but
the effects of decision criteria (or the resulting response bias) on
ERPs recorded during recognition memory tasks have been
investigated quite rarely.
Two ERP investigations of response bias exist that focused on
the effects of emotions on shifts of the criterion to respond ‘‘old’’ in
an old/new recognition memory task [34,35]. These studies
identified a reduced ERP old/new effect at prefrontal sites
between 300 and 500 ms as the correlate of a more liberal
decision-criterion that was associated with emotionally negative
items relative to emotionally neutral items. The same correlate was
later found for a recognition memory task involving only neutral
words in comparing individuals generally adopting a liberal bias
with those adopting a conservative bias [36]. Importantly, in that
study, the overall bias (averaged across old/new conditions) also
correlated positively (.453) with the overall negative ERP
amplitude recorded at prefrontal sites, an important piece of
evidence that is independent of ERP old/new differences.
[37] confirmed and extended these findings by varying decision
criteria within participants via instructions: In one condition,
participants were asked to respond conservatively to old items
(respond ‘‘old’’ only when sure that the item is old); in the other
response condition, participants were asked to make a conservative
decision to new items (i.e., reject only when sure that the item is
new). Consistent with the prior studies, they found an early (300–
500 ms poststimulus) old/new effect in a frontal ERP component
presumably reflecting familiarity (as opposed to recollection)
differentiating the two bias conditions. Furthermore, their data
also showed more positive overall amplitudes in the conservative
condition relative to liberal. Importantly, and grossly in line with
SDTs assumption of statistical independence of bias and accuracy,
in all these studies, there were no confounding differences in
accurate memory performance between the bias conditions.
In summary, evidence shows that variations in the criteria
underlying old/new decisions appear to affect relatively early ERP
measures at frontal sites. As such, they precede consciously
controlled memory processes and occur approximately coinciden-
tally with unconscious, implicit memory retrieval and automatic
familiarity effects [29–32]. The response bias thus has been
construed to reflect the default setting, or response gate, for ‘‘old’’
decisions that is (relatively) wide open in the case of a liberal
criterion, and (relatively) occluded in the case of a conservative
criterion, and then awaits to be either confirmed or overturned by
the later retrieved memory information [36].
Some researchers have interpreted the ERP correlates of
decision criterion in terms of memory strength, indexing different
degrees of familiarity required for ‘‘old’’ judgments [37], while
others describe the criteria independent of item retrieval processes
in terms of decision-making as part of executive control processes
[34,36]. The former interpretation appears to relate more to
stimulus attributes (familiarity), with the bias becoming more
liberal when both item distributions are shifted upwards on the
familiarity dimension (Figure 1). By contrast, the latter account
refers to criterion setting in terms of a top-down controlled process
that depends on preferences and goal states of the individual. For
the behavioral parameters derived from SDT and the 2 HTM,
these two processes are indistinguishable, for both lead to changes
in the bias measure, despite the different underlying cognitive
processes. ERP correlates might help to differentiate these two
mechanisms, but given the sparse empirical basis, and the lack of
direct comparisons, it is at present unclear whether and exactly
what ERP correlates of decision bias are sensitive to manipulations
of either top-down or bottom-up driven processes indexing
executive control or familiarity, respectively.
The present study
In a series of three experiments, we pursued two goals. First, we
set out to find ERP correlates of decision bias that are independent
of memory task demands. That is, across three different variants of
recognition memory tasks, we searched for a common denomi-
nator in the ERPs that would be sensitive and specific to bias
effects. These effects would be reflected in ERP main effects of bias
in all three memory tasks. Second, we investigated ERP correlates
of bias that would depend on or vary with memory task demands,
and would therefore be influenced by memory task context. These
latter processes would be specific for the memory task performed,
and would be reflected in interactions of ERP correlates of bias
with memory processes.
In all experiments, participants performed recognition memory
tasks with words while their decision bias was varied via
instructions. In addition, one other variable was manipulated,
setting the particular memory task context. Specifically, top-down
(self-controlled, goal-related) as opposed to bottom-up driven
processes (automatic, familiarity-related) were manipulated in
either memory retrieval or decision-making:
In Experiment 1, we varied the degree of top-down executive
control involved in criterion-setting in addition to the bias
manipulation via instructions: In one condition (block), the bias
was manipulated blockwise so that criterion-setting processes were
allowed to automatize, whereas in the other condition (random),
the bias manipulation occurred randomized across trials such that
participants had to flexibly shift their decision criterion on a trial-
by-trial basis depending on an external cue as in a task-switching
paradigm. In essence, the task varied memory of (or retrieval of)
criterion activation: automatized versus controlled.
In Experiment 2, automatic memory, more specifically, bottom-
up driven familiarity, of studied items was varied in addition to a
standard (blockwise) bias manipulation via instruction: Half of the
old items were presented three times at study instead of only once
to boost their familiarity, shifting the distribution of old items
upwards on the memory strength dimension (thereby facilitating
old/new discrimination). This design allowed us to compare ERP
effects of bias at two different levels of accurate old/new
recognition memory to test the independence assumption of
SDT and 2 HTM.
Experiment 3 again manipulated bottom-up driven familiarity;
however, not only in studied (old) items, but also unstudied (new)
items, via a separate reading task presented before the study phase
of the recognition memory task, with the intention to shift
distributions of both old and new items upwards on the memory
strength dimension. Again, this manipulation was performed in
parallel to the same blockwise manipulation of bias as in
Experiments 1 and 2. We presumed that the reading task would
induce a retrieval bias for highly familiar items, analogously to the
process dissociation procedure [38]. We expected this manipula-
tion to affect the response bias and were interested in how this
would affect the bias manipulation via instruction as reflected in
the associated ERPs.
In summary, our experiments meant to determine and
challenge the sensitivity and the consistency of ERP bias effects
in different recognition memory task contexts. All experimental
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manipulations were performed within participants. Given the
prior studies on ERP bias effects and their relation to familiarity
[33,37], we focused specifically on the time window of 300–
500 ms poststimulus at frontocentral recording sites, consistent
with familiarity effects obtained after averaged reference transfor-
mation, c.f. [23,33]). Visual inspection of the grand averages
revealed a frontocentral component around 320 ms poststimulus
in all three Experiments that served as the ROI in the main
statistical analyses. In addition, we analyzed standard ERP
recognition memory measures by taking amplitudes from frontal
[33–36] and parietal electrodes in early (300–500 ms poststimulus)
and late (500–700 ms poststimulus) time-windows [39,29,36]). For
descriptive purposes, T-maps of all effects between 200 and
800 ms poststimulus are shown for all electrode sites in the
Supporting Information, Figures S1–S3.
Following common practice in ERP memory research, we used
only correct response trials in the ERP analyses. This would
maximize old/new differences and also make our results
comparable with prior publications. Note that in this design,
ERP correlates of accurate memory refer to differences between
old and new items whereas ERP correlates of bias refer to
differences between liberal and conservative response criteria.
Both effects are obtained because different types of items are
contained in the ERP averages: In the case of accurate old/new
recognition, ERPs averaged across correctly recognized old items
(hits) are compared with ERPs averaged across correctly
recognized new items (correct rejections), with the resulting ERP
difference reflecting the mean familiarity difference between old
and new item distributions in terms of SDT (see Figure 1). In the
case of bias, ERPs averaged across items falling above the
conservative response criterion on the memory strength dimension
are compared to ERPs averaged across items falling above the
liberal response criterion. Both item types are judged ‘‘old’’, but
the latter type (liberal) contains more trials associated with
relatively low levels of familiarity compared to the former
(conservative). That same comparison of conservative versus
liberal is then again performed on ERPs averaged across items
falling below the response threshold (items judged ‘‘new’’), and
should yield the same ERP difference, if assumptions of SDT hold.
In both cases, the conservative/liberal difference reflects the ERP
correlate of two different thresholds on the familiarity dimension,
thresholds above which ‘‘old’’ responses are rendered and below
which ‘‘new’’ responses are rendered (Figure 1). For these
comparisons, it is not relevant whether the compared items are
correctly recognized (as in our case) or not, for as long as the
comparison is performed between conservative and liberal
response criteria.
Contrary to SDT, 2 HTM makes no assumptions on the degree
of familiarity associated with a high versus low decision threshold
(Br), in fact, the model makes no claim about the cognitive or
representational dimension underlying different guessing biases. In
that sense, taken at face value, 2 HTM appears closer to executive
control accounts of response bias that describe decision criteria as
top-down controlled in accordance with goals, expectations, and
preferences rooted outside the memory domain, and not directly
in terms of threshold points on the familiarity dimension. This is
the main reason why we chose to use 2 HTM of bias and accuracy
in our main analyses. Another commonality of the two frameworks
is that the ERP correlates of accuracy and bias should be
statistically independent of one another; in fact, Snodgrass and
Corwin [26] found this assumption to be most valid for the
2 HTM. Hence, we expected ERP bias effects to show either a
different topography or a different time course than ERP effects of
accurate memory.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we varied the decision criterion by standard
means through instruction in two ways: In one condition (block),
participants were asked to use either a liberal or a conservative bias
constantly across blocks of 160 recognition memory test trials; in
the other condition (random), they were instructed to vary the
decision criterion (liberal or conservative) in accord with a cue
given directly prior to each memory test trial. The first condition
allowed the bias to automatize within large blocks of trials,
whereas the latter condition required executive control to flexibly
modulate the bias on a trial-by-trial basis, as in a typical task-
switching paradigm. The manipulation was meant to provoke
dynamic adaptations of criterion-setting (or criterion-activation)
processes, including temporal adjustments, owing to cognitive
control processes induced by task context.
Materials and Methods Experiment 1
Participants. Data were obtained from 34 participants
(students) who participated for course credit or a monetary reward
of 20 Euro. All participants were healthy native German speakers
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave signed
informed consent before participating in the experiment. Data of
two participants had to be excluded due to an insufficient quality
of the ERP data.
Of the remaining 32 participants, 8 did not comply with task
instructions in at least one of the two conditions (random or block).
That is, these participants did not adopt a more liberal bias in the
liberal condition relative to conservative. This happened appar-
ently because some participants confused the conditions on some
of the trials, especially directly after experimental blocks had
changed. We excluded these non-conforming participants from
the main analysis but show their performance and ERPs in Figure
S4.
The final sample consisted of 24 participants (16 females). Mean
age was 21.5 years (range 19–28). Handedness was assessed using a
German version of the Edinburgh Inventory [40], twenty-three
participants were right-handed.
Stimuli and stimulation sequences. Eight lists of 80
emotionally neutral words each were created using the German
Handbook of Word Norms [41]. Lists were constructed to be
parallel (and were in fact not significantly different) with regards to
mean word length (numbers of syllables between 2–3, numbers of
letters between 5–10), valence, arousal, concreteness, and word
frequency (frequencies were obtained from the Celex database,
Centre for Lexical Information, Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlands). Lists were ran-
domly assigned to the experimental conditions; lists of old and new
words were counterbalanced across participants. For all conditions
(random/block and conservative/liberal), the study list contained
40 words, and the recognition test list contained 80 words (40 old
and 40 new).
Procedures. Stimuli were presented in the center of a
computer screen using the Presentation 10.2 software (Neurobe-
havioral Systems, www.neurobs.com). Given a viewing distance of
about 1 m, visual angle of the stimulation was up to 3u in width
and 0.6u in height. For the study phase, words were displayed for
400 ms followed by an interstimulus interval (ISI) of 1400 ms.
Participants were instructed to read these words attentively, so
without any reference to item retention and later retrieval.
For the recognition phase in the block condition, participants
were cued before each block of 40 test items about the decision
criterion to use (liberal or conservative, quasi-randomized order)
with either an image of a lady lying relaxed in a deckchair (liberal
FN320 and Decision Bias
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condition) or a sternly looking lady (conservative condition); the
images were taken from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS, images 2037 and 2372) [42]. In the random condition,
participants were instructed before each trial about the decision
type to use (liberal, conservative) with the corresponding cue
image shown for 500 ms, followed by a blank screen for 900–
1100 ms (randomized duration). In the conservative condition,
participants were instructed to ‘‘respond ‘old’ (using the mouse
button) only when you know for sure that the word had been
presented in the study phase, or otherwise press ‘new’’’. In the
liberal condition, they were instructed to respond ‘old’ when they
had ‘‘a feeling that the word might have been presented in the
study phase, or otherwise press ‘new’’’. In both conditions, on each
trial a fixation cross was presented for a randomly varying
duration of 1400 to 1800 ms followed by the test word displayed
for up to 3 sec or until the participant made a response.
Participants were instructed to respond as fast and accurately as
possible.
Participants obtained practice trials prior to testing. They then
started either with all blocks of the random condition or with all
blocks of the block condition, with liberal and conservative
conditions balanced across participants. Breaks between blocks of
40 trials as well as between study and recognition test were self-
paced. They were asked to blink or move only during intertrial
intervals if possible.
EEG recordings. A 62-channel EEG was recorded contin-
uously with BrainAmp DC-amplifiers (BrainProducts, Gilching,
Germany; sample rate 250 Hz, resolution 0.1 mV/bit, input-
impedance 10 MOhm) using an equidistant EasyCap (EasyCap
GmbH, Herrsching-Breitbrunn, Germany, www.easycap.de) with
sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes. Eye blinks and movements were
monitored with supra- and infra-orbital electrodes and with
electrodes on the external canthi. The vertex electrode was used as
reference. To avoid injuries due to skin abrasion, electrode
impedances were kept below 20 kOhm which is considered more
than sufficient from the electrical engineering perspective [43,44].
Data analysis. Accurate old/new recognition memory
Pr=HR - FAR and the response bias Br=FAR/(1 - Pr) were
computed according to 2 HTM [3,26], where HR is the
probability of ‘‘old’’ responses to old items, and FAR is the
probability of ‘‘old’’ responses to new items. Correct rejections
(CR) were defined as the probability of ‘‘new’’ responses to new
items. We additionally computed nonparametric SDT parameters
A for accuracy and b for bias following [4], and the parametric
estimates d9 and c following [2], with cases of FAR=0 or HR=1
set to missing (as opposed to corrected) as this occurred less than 2
times per condition.
The EEG was analyzed using the Vision Analyzer 1.05 software
(BrainProducts, Gilching, Germany; www.brainproducts.com).
EEG data were digitally filtered with 30 Hz/24 dB Butterworth
zero phase lowpass and 0.1 Hz/12 dB highpass, segmented into
epochs of 2200 ms to 1500 ms around stimulus onset, and
baseline corrected (2200 to 0 ms). After removing segments with
very large artefacts (exceeding 6500 mV), eye blinks were
corrected using independent component analysis (ICA). ICA
components containing eye blink activity were identified by
inspecting their topographical distribution, and comparing the
time course of components and EEG for co-occurence of blinks in
random samples. After removing the blink component(s), success
of this procedure was controlled by comparing the EEG data from
before and from after the correction. Furthermore, accuracy of
ICA blink removal was checked by comparing the results of blink
removal with elimination of blink trials. Because the study phase
contained a total of 320 segments, a sufficient number of blink-free
segments was available for this comparison. Data were baseline
corrected again to remove offset inaccuracies due to ICA blink
removal. After applying a semiautomatic procedure for artefact
detection (amplitude criterion 650 mV, gradient 20 mV/sample),
the complete datasets were inspected again visually. Traces of
single channels containing artefacts were removed. If there were
more than ten contaminated traces, the whole segment was
removed. Only participants were included with at least 15
segments in each condition, provided that standard visual evoked
potentials (P100, N170) were clearly visible. Segments were
averaged separately for correct response trials of the different
experimental conditions. Segments with response times outside the
time window of 100 ms to 1500 ms poststimulus were removed.
Averages were rereferenced (average reference transform [45]),
and the reconstructed vertex reference was added to the data,
resulting in 61 EEG channels.
For the frontocentral negative component (FN320), ERP
amplitudes were analyzed at FCz and the six surrounding
electrodes (Fz, F1, F2, FC1, FC2, Cz) between 300 and 350 ms
poststimulus. For the standard analyses, frontal ERP amplitudes
were taken at Fz and the six surrounding electrodes (AFz, AF3,
AF4, F1, F2, FCz) and parietal sites (Cz, CP1, CP2, CPz, P1, P2,
Pz) in early (300–500 ms) and late (500–700 ms poststimulus) time
windows, respectively. These amplitude measures were analyzed
using ANOVAs with the four repeated measures factors Electrode
Site, Block (block/random), Criterion (liberal/conservative), and
Old/New. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values were applied
when needed. The Newman-Keuls test was used for post-hoc tests.
Results Experiment 1
Behavioral data. Figure 2 displays hit rates, false alarm
rates, bias, accuracy, and RTs in the four experimental conditions.
The two-way (Block x Criterion) ANOVA of the bias measure Br
revealed a main effect for criterion, as expected (conservative ,
liberal; F(1, 23) = 88.9, p,.001, eta2=0.79), and a significant
Block x Criterion interaction: F(1, 23) = 7.76, p,.011, eta2=0.25,
indicating a significantly smaller conservative , liberal bias
difference in the random condition relative to block, in line with
our presumption that shifting the bias in the random condition
would be more difficult relative to block. Analysis of accurate old/
new recognition memory Pr revealed no significant effects.
Parameters Br and Pr were highly correlated with the SDT
indices on bias and accuracy, respectively (average correlations of
r= .90), as detailed in Table S1 of the Supporting Information.
RTs for correct responses (Figure 2, bottom) were analyzed by
an ANOVA with the three within-subjects factors Response Type
(old/new), Criterion (liberal/conservative), and Block (block/
random). The main effects revealed faster responses for old vs.
new items: F(1, 23) = 8.95, p= .001, eta2=0.28, as is typical for
recognition memory judgments, as well as faster responses for the
blocked vs. random condition: F(1, 23) = 4.59, p,.05, eta2=0.17,
again confirming that the block condition was easier than the
random condition. The interaction Criterion x Old/New was also
significant: F(1, 23) = 15.04, p,.001, eta2=0.4. Furthermore, the
three-way interaction was close to significance: F(1, 23) = 4.14, p,
.054, eta2=0.15. Figure 2 shows that the pattern results from the
fact that speeded responses to old items as compared to new items
were observed in all conditions except the conservative condition
in the blocked trials, where this difference was much smaller and
almost nonexistent.
ERP data. The frontocentral negativity peaking around
320 ms with a maximum at FCz (FN320) was sensitive to the
effects of criterion (Figure 3). The ANOVA of mean amplitudes
(time window 300–350 ms) taken at FCz and the six surrounding
FN320 and Decision Bias
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sites (see insert in Figure 3) revealed that the component was larger
(more negative) in the liberal compared to the conservative
condition (F(1, 23) = 12.40, p,0.002, eta2=0.35; Figure 3); a
small potential difference that was highly consistent across
participants. There were no further effects except for a main
effect for Electrode Site: F(6, 138) = 8.38, p,.001, eta2=0.27
indicating that the size of the bias effect varied somewhat within
the cluster.
Notably, across all participants, including the eight participants
that were excluded from the main analysis because they failed to
shift their decision criteria in line with instructions (see Figure S4),
bias effects in the FN320 correlated positively with variations in
the behavioral measure Br (Pearson’s r= .56, N=32, p,.001).
That is, the more the participants varied their decision criterion in
line with instructions, the larger were the observed amplitude
differences in FN320 (liberal higher FN320 amplitude than
conservative). In the subsample of participants who did comply
with instructions, the correlation was also positive albeit not
significant (Pearson’s r= .36, N=24, p,.82).
Results from the standard analysis of ERP old/new effects are
shown in Tables 1 and 2.
In the early time-window (300–500 ms poststimulus) at frontal
ERP sites, there was a significant main effect of criterion as ERPs
were less negative (more positive) going in the conservative
condition relative to liberal. This effect reflected the same potential
difference that has been described above for the frontocentral
component FN320 (Figure 3), albeit with a slightly smaller effect
size. There was also a significant interaction of old/new by block
at these frontal sites, resulting from larger old/new differences in
the random condition relative to block, where old/new differences
were actually slightly reversed. At parietal sites, there were
significant ERP old/new effects alongside a three-way interaction
showing that the old/new effects were missing in the block
condition for the liberal criterion. All these effects can be seen in
the amplitude plots in Figure 4.
In the late time-window (500–700 ms poststimulus), ERPs
showed a main old/new effect at parietal sites, plus an interaction
of old/new with block, as old/new effects were larger in the
blocked condition relative to random. At frontal sites (see
Figure 4), old/new differences were almost absent in the blocked
condition for the conservative criterion, and overall, amplitudes
were less negative in the blocked condition, which led to a
significant main effect of block and a significant old/new by
criterion interaction.
Discussion Experiment 1
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to assess ERP correlates of
decision criteria in recognition memory judgments varied in line
with experimental instructions either in an automatized, blockwise
manner, or on a trial-by-trial randomized basis. We aimed to
identify ERP correlates of, first, conservative as compared to
liberal decision bias; and second, of automatized, habitual
criterion-activation as compared to cue-dependent criterion shifts
requiring the retrieval and maintenance of the cue as well as the
flexible control of the decision bias on a given trial. Behavioral
data showed that the latter condition was indeed more difficult
relative to the automatized block condition as RTs were longer
and the expected difference in the bias Br (liberal . conservative)
was lower. The interesting question was how these variations
would be reflected in the ERP correlates of memory and bias.
The ERP analysis revealed a frontocentral negative component
(FN320) sensitive to the manipulation of decision criterion, with a
smaller (i.e., more positive) amplitude for the conservative
compared to the liberal condition. The direction and spatial
distribution of this ERP difference was in line with our
expectations, but the duration was relatively short. In absolute
terms, the FN320 modulation was quite small (about 0.2 mV) but
nonetheless reached a high significance level due to the high
consistency across participants. Data of eight participants who did
not comply with the criterion-setting instructions and who were
excluded from the main analysis showed a tendency towards the
reversed pattern (i.e., less negative FN320 for liberal compared to
conservative (Figure S4). Although the component was generally
not very clearly pronounced in that subsample, we think that this
reversed amplitude difference further confirms our interpretation
of the FN320 as a correlate (or part of a correlate) of bias.
Neither old/new effects nor the block/random manipulation
modulated the FN320 in any significant way. However, these two
Figure 2. Hitrates (HR) and False Alarm Rates (FAR, top), Bias Br
and Accurate Old/New Recognition Pr (center), and RTs
(bottom) for Experiment 1 (error bars display standard errors).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g002
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factors, in parallel to criterion, did modulate frontal ERPs in the
standard time-window of 300 to 500 ms poststimulus; with a
pattern suggesting, first, higher positivity associated with a
conservative criterion relative to liberal – a reflection of the same
effect found in the FN320 – and secondly, positive old/new
differences in the random condition compared to negative old/
new differences in the block condition. At parietal sites, there were
clearly significant old/new differences in all conditions except for
the conservative bias in the block condition. Importantly, this
difference between conservative and liberal was functionally
different than that at the frontal sites as it reflected no main effect
of criterion but a three-way interaction of criterion, block/
random, and old/new item status.
In the late time-window of the standard analysis, frontal ERPs
were less negative overall in the block condition relative to
random, and effects of criterion interacted with ERP old/new
differences as these were positive in the conservative condition and
negative in the liberal condition. At parietal sites, ERPs showed
stronger old/new effects in the block condition relative to random.
We suggest that this mixture of interaction effects might reflect
task-context effects; these appeared more complex at the frontal
sites relative to parietal. Of particular interest is that retrieved old/
new item information interacted with habitual (automatized) as
compared to flexible (top-down controlled) criterion signals. At the
parietal sites, the stronger old/new effects in the blocked condition
compared to random suggest facilitated old/new differentiation
based on controlled retrieval, in line with stronger effects in
behavioral bias Br and shorter reaction times. However, late ERPs
generally contain more variation within and between individuals
due to variation in strategy and performance level compared with
the more stimulus-driven early ERP correlates, so without any
further support, we must maintain cautious about the interpreta-
tion of these effects purely in terms of task difficulty.
Taken together, the picture suggests that the FN320 component
might be more specific to within-participant’s variation of decision
bias induced by instructions relative to the standard analysis, and
more robust against the relatively strong experimental effects of
automatizing versus flexible trial-by-trial control found in the
behavior and the standard analysis. From the temporal pattern, it
Figure 3. Only data of the 24 participants who varied the decision criterion in line with instructions are included in this Figure. TOP:
Frontocentral grand average ERPs for the random condition (left) and the block condition (right) of Experiment 1. The negative component (FN320)
peaking around 320 ms was larger (more negative) for the liberal than for the conservative decision criterion. BOTTOM: Parietal grand average ERPs
for the random condition (left) and the block condition (right) of Experiment 1. The displayed waveforms are averaged across the seven sites
included in the statistical analysis (see inserts).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g003
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appears as if the FN320 might precede any task- or context-
specific memory retrieval processes.
Notably, the effects of criterion found in the FN320 were main
effects, with conservative less negative than liberal. This finding is
in accord with our notion that the criterion reflects a threshold set
on the memory strength dimension above which ‘‘old’’ responses
are rendered and below which ‘‘new’’ responses are rendered. As
the criterion is set at a higher level of familiarity in the conservative
condition relative to liberal, its ERP correlate is a more positive
potential, in line with the many ERP studies showing familiarity,
memory strength, and retrieval confidence to increase ERP
positivity. By contrast, the standard analysis that found interac-
tions of old/new with other variables of task context, including
criterion, is consistent with prior reports that reported interactions
of bias effects with ERP old/new differences [35–37], suggesting
an interaction of response bias processes with memory retrieval
Table 1. Results of the ANOVA of frontal ERP amplitudes.
Experiment Experiment 1 Experiment 2* Experiment 3
Design (Factor) Random/Block Condition (HighFam, LowFam, New) Familiarity (High/Low)
Time Window (ms) Early (300–500) Late (500–700) Early (300–500) Late (500–700) Early (300–500) Late (500–700)
Old/New F(2, 48)=16.02, p,.001,
gp
2= .40 Post hoc: (HighFam




F(1, 25) = 7.49,
p= .011, gp
2 = .23
Criterion (Lib/Con) F(1, 23)=8.78,
p= .007, gp
2= .28
F(1, 24) = 7.2,
p= .013, gp
2 = .23






Old/New x Criterion F(1, 23)=8.8,
p,.007, gp
2= .28










F(2, 48) = 3.26, p,.05,
gp
2 = .12 Post hoc:
Cons_LowFam . Cons_New
Note: Only significant results are shown. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values are reported for effects in Experiment 2. Highlighted are late interactions of old/new
with criterion. For electrode locations, see Methods section of Experiment 1.*Experiment 2 contained factor Condition with the three levels HighFam (Old items with
high familiarity), LowFam (Old items with low familiarity), and New (new items). Effects were entered in the Old/New row when HighFam and LowFam were both
significantly different from New. Effects were entered in the Old/New x TF row when HighFam was significantly different from LowFam in addition to LowFam being
significantly different from New.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.t001
Table 2. Results of the ANOVA of parietal ERP amplitudes.
Experiment Experiment 1 Experiment 2* Experiment 3
Design (Factor) Random/Block Condition (HighFam, LowFam, New) Familiarity (High/Low)
Time Window
(ms)
Early (300–500) Late (500–700) Early (300–500) Late (500–700) Early
(300–500)
Late (500–700)
Old/New F(1, 23) = 6.42, p,
.002, gp
2 = .22
F(1, 23) = 12.19, p,
.002, gp
2 = .35
F(2, 48) = 15.97, p,.001, gp
2 = .40
Post hoc: (HighFam = LowFam)
. New
















F(1, 23) = 5.64, p,
.027, gp
2 = .20
F(2, 48) = 21.66, p,.001, gp
2 = .47





F(1, 23) = 7.53, p,
.002, gp
2 = .25
Note: Only significant results are shown. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values are reported for effects in Experiment 2. For electrode locations, see Methods section of
Experiment 1. *Experiment 2 contained factor Condition with the three levels HighFam (Old items with high familiarity), LowFam (Old items with low familiarity), and
New (new items). Effects were entered in the Old/New row when HighFam and LowFam were both significantly different from New. Effects were entered in the Old/
New x TF row when HighFam was significantly different from LowFam in addition to LowFam being significantly different from New.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.t002
FN320 and Decision Bias
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e106411
processes. To the degree that ERP old/new differences reflect
accurate old/new discrimination, and not bias, such interactions
are surprising, and inconsistent with the assumption of signal
detection theory that discrimination performance and response
bias are statistically independent, although this implication has not
been discussed before in the existing ERP literature on bias.
We conducted Experiment 2 to more directly investigate the
possibility that memory processes and criterion setting processes
interact in our region of interest and in the standard ERP
correlates of recognition memory.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined whether the bias manipulation
by instruction would affect ERPs differently at two different levels
of accurate old/new discrimination, to explore the possibility that
criterion setting functions interact with memory retrieval process-
es. Decision criteria were manipulated by instruction in the same
way as in the block condition of Experiment 1. In addition, we
varied familiarity of the study items: Half of the old items were
presented three times in the study phase to increase memory
strength (high familiarity condition), half of them were presented
only once as in any standard recognition memory task (low
familiarity condition). ERPs between 300 to 500 ms are known to
be sensitive to stimulus repetition effects, typically at posterior sites,
while effects of perceived similarity occur at frontal sites [30–
37,46,50,57]. We thus expected the effects of the familiarity
manipulation by stimulus repetition to be temporally overlapping
with, but spatially separable from the effects of the bias
manipulation.
Materials and Methods Experiment 2
Participants. Data were obtained from 35 participants
(students) who participated for course credit or a money reward
of 20 Euro. All participants were healthy native German speakers
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave signed
informed consent before participating in the experiment. Data of
ten participants had to be excluded either due to an insufficient
number of hits in one condition (conservative, low familiarity,
n = 3) or due to large drift artefacts (n = 7). Thus, the final sample
size consisted of 25 (20 females). The mean age was 24.9 years
(range 19–43). All participants were right-handed.
Materials and procedures. Design and stimuli were the
same as in Experiment 1 with the exception that the third factor
(familiarity) was manipulated only in old items. Eight lists of words
were created, each one containing a study list of 40 words of which
20 were shown once and 20 were repeated three times (in random
order). Each test list contained 80 words (20+20 old and 40 new).
Procedures, EEG-recordings and analyses were identical to
Experiment 1. As a first step, we chose the same region and time
window as in Experiment 1 for the ERP measures. In determining
the behavioral indices Br and Pr, false alarm rates to new items
were used for both, the high and the low familiarity conditions.
Results Experiment 2
Behavioral data. Figure 5 displays hit rates, false alarm
rates, bias, accuracy, and RTs for Experiment 2. All 25
participants had higher HR and FAR in the liberal condition
compared to the conservative condition. The two-way (Criterion x
Familiarity) ANOVA of the bias measure Br revealed the expected
Figure 4. Mean ERP amplitudes taken in early (300–500 ms poststimulus) and late (500–700 ms poststimulus) time-windows at
frontal (AFz, AF3, AF4, F1, F2, FCz, Fz) and parietal (see insert in Figure 3) sites in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g004
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main effect for Criterion (conservative , liberal; F(1, 24) = 94.2,
p,.001, eta2=0.8), in line with instructions, a main effect for
Familiarity (low , high): F(1, 24) = 59.4, p,.001, eta2=0.71, and
a Criterion x Familiarity interaction: F(1, 24) = 6.25, p,.02,
eta2=0.21, indicating a larger familiarity effect in the liberal
condition relative to conservative. The analysis of accurate old/
new recognition Pr revealed a main effect of Familiarity (low ,
high): F(1, 24) = 239.2, p,.001, eta2=0.91, as the high familiarity
condition was easier, as expected, and a Criterion x Familiarity
interaction: F(1, 24) = 4.74, p,.04, eta2=0.16, indicating for the
low familiarity condition a larger difference liberal vs. conserva-
tive.
As in Experiment 1, Br and Pr correlated highly (average
r= .94) with SDT indices of bias and accuracy, respectively, as
detailed in Table S1.
Mean RTs for correct responses were analyzed by an ANOVA
of the two within-subjects factors Condition with three levels (old-
low-familiarity, old-high-familiarity, new) and Criterion (liberal/
conservative). A significant interaction showed RTs to be higher
for new items in the liberal condition compared to all other
conditions; F(2, 48) = 28.2, p,.001, eta2=0.54.
ERP data. As in Experiment 1, a frontocentral FN320
peaking around 320 ms with a maximum at FCz was apparent
(Figure 6). The ANOVA of the repeated measures factors
Electrode Site, Criterion (liberal, conservative) and Condition
(with the three levels old-low-familiarity, old-high-familiarity, new)
performed on mean ERP amplitudes taken at 300–350 ms
poststimulus at the seven frontocentral sites revealed main effects
for Electrode Site: F(6, 144) = 2.72, p,.02, eta2=0.10, and for
Criterion: F(1, 24) = 5.95, p,.023, eta2=0.20. As in Experiment
1, the component was larger (i.e., more negative) in the liberal
compared to the conservative condition (for both, old and new
items). A significant effect of Condition was found as well: F(2,
48) = 4.33, p,.022, eta2=0.15. The post-hoc comparison revealed
a significantly more positive FN320 amplitude for old items (both
high and low in familiarity) compared to new. No significant
interaction of Criterion x Condition was obtained (p= .44).
It should be noted that in contrast to Experiment 1, the ERP
difference between the liberal and conservative conditions did not
disappear after 350 ms but maintained until 460 ms poststimulus
for new items, and extended even until about 600 ms poststimulus
for old items (see Figures 6 and S2).
The standard analysis of ERP old/new effects (detailed in
Tables 1 and 2) showed the same criterion effect that is reflected in
the FN320, albeit temporally more extended, at frontal sites in the
early time-window (300–500 ms poststimulus): The conservative
criterion was associated with more positive going ERPs relative to
the liberal, with a similar effects size as in the FN320 (eta2= .20).
In addition, the factor condition was significant for which post hoc
tests indicated that old items (both high and low in familiarity)
were significantly more positive going than were new items (see
amplitude plots in Figure 7). That same effect of condition was
also significant for early parietal ERPs, albeit without any
significant main effect of criterion (hence criterion is not
differentiated in Figure 7).
In the late time-window (500–700 ms poststimulus), the pattern
was slightly different for the liberal condition: Frontal ERPs
showed the significant old/new effect only for the conservative
criterion (interaction of Condition x Criterion). At parietal ERP
sites, there was again a main effect of condition; post hoc tests
indicated that old items of high familiarity were significantly more
positive going than were old items of low familiarity which, in turn,
were significantly more positive going than new items. Hence the
analysis of late parietal ERPs is the only one where effects of
induced memory strength (high versus low familiarity) became
significant. No other effects or interaction effects were significant.
Discussion Experiment 2
Behavioral data (hit rates and false alarm rates) showed that the
manipulation of the decision criterion was again successful.
Furthermore, higher hit rates and shorter RTs for high familiarity
in comparison to low familiarity study items showed that the
manipulation of memory strength was successful as well. This led
to higher old/new recognition accuracy in the high familiarity
condition, but also to a more liberal bias, consistent with earlier
studies [39,47].
Confirming the results of Experiment 1, the frontocentral
FN320 component was modulated by the decision criterion; it was
smaller (more positive) in the conservative condition relative to the
Figure 5. Hitrates (HR) and False Alarm Rates (FAR, top), Bias Br
and Accurate Old/New Recognition Pr (center), and RTs
(bottom) for Experiment 2 (error bars display standard errors).
Note that Br and Pr are computed from the same False Alarm Rates for
both levels of familiarity since familiarity was not manipulated in new
items in this design (but see Experiment 3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g005
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liberal condition. Unlike in Experiment 1, however, this effect
extended over time until about 450 ms poststimulus, and was
distributed more anteriorly, where it became significant in frontal
ERPs taken in the early time-window of 300–500 ms poststimulus,
grossly in line with previous reports [37].
In these early frontal ERPs, we did not find any differential
effect of bias at high versus low levels of familiarity, suggesting that
these ERP correlates were independent of our manipulation of
memory strength. As found in Experiment 1, the conservative
criterion was generally associated with more positive amplitudes
relative to the liberal criterion, an effect that was visible in both,
ERPs to old items (hits) and ERPs to new items (correct rejections;
see Figure 6). This independence of ERP bias effects from early
ERP old/new differences conforms to the theoretical understand-
ing of decision bias being statistically independent of memory for
studied items.
However, effects of bias did interact with old/new differences in
the late time-window (500–700 ms poststimulus), when old/new
effects became larger for the conservative condition relative to
liberal at frontal ERP sites, albeit being still insensitive to the
effects of familiarity (i.e., memory strength). At parietal sites, ERPs
were sensitive to the familiarity of the studied items, in line with
earlier reports where list strength was manipulated [39]. This
difference emerged in both bias conditions.
We conclude that early ERP effects of bias occurred at frontal
sites consistently and independently of memory strength effects
across the two investigated levels of item familiarity, and more
sustained so than in Experiment 1, possibly because task
conditions allowed participants to maintain an automatized
criterion across blocks of trials in all conditions. However, as in
Experiment 1, bias effects interacted with ERP old/new effects late
during the recording epoch at frontal sites, where ERP old/new
differences were more sensitive to study status in the conservative
condition relative to liberal. We speculate that participants gave
priority to the setting of the criterion during initial processing of
the test stimuli, and focused on familiarity only later on during the
trial, presumably by involving controlled retrieval processes.
Experiment 3
To further test and challenge ERP correlates of bias, we used
another manipulation that is suitable for manipulating the bias via
Figure 6. Frontocentral grand average ERPs for old (left) and new (right) items of Experiment 2. The negative FN320 component peaking
around 320 ms was larger (more negative) for the liberal than for the conservative decision criterion. BOTTOM: Parietal grand average ERPs for the
random condition (left) and the block condition (right) of Experiment 2. The displayed waveforms are averaged across the seven sites included in the
statistical analysis (see inserts).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g006
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bottom-up driven familiarity, meaning to affect early ERP indices
of memory retrieval. While maintaining the participant-driven
manipulation of bias by blockwise instruction, as in Experiments 1
and 2, participants’ decision-making was additionally manipulated
on a trial-by-trial basis, albeit this time not through subject-driven
control processes as in Experiment 1, but through bottom-up
driven familiarity effects, as in Experiment 2. However, contrary
to Experiment 2, this memory manipulation was meant to affect
only the bias, not accurate old/new discrimination, and to
specifically target automatic, involuntary retrieval from memory.
To that end, we induced high familiarity in both, old and new
items, thereby inducing memory intrusions. We preexposed
participants in a separate reading task performed prior to the
study phase of the recognition memory task to half of the test
items, of which half were presented in the subsequent study phase
of the recognition memory task (old test words), and half were not
(new test words). In the subsequent recognition memory test,
recognizing prestudied old test words as ‘‘old’’ is relatively easy as
the preexposure automatically boosts feelings of familiarity.
However, recognizing prestudied new words (that occurred in
the preexposure phase but not in the study phase) as ‘‘new’’ is
difficult as the preexposure would make these items feel old,
leading to inadvertent memory intrusions unless the source of the
oldness feeling is clearly distinguished. As a consequence, while the
preexposure manipulation increases hit rates (‘‘old’’ responses to
old items), it also increases false alarm rates (‘‘old’’ responses to
new items). The manipulation thus increases the bias to respond
‘‘old’’ by increasing familiarity through preexposure – without
affecting accurate old/new recognition performance.
Notably, contrary to the coincident manipulation of bias by task
instruction, which can only be top-down controlled by participants
(albeit automatized over blocks of trials), the bias manipulation by
preexposure induces a stimulus-driven retrieval bias due to
enhanced item fluency and accessibility [38,48,49]. In comparing
the high familiarity (preexposure) and the low familiarity (no
preexposure) conditions in the conservative and liberal conditions,
respectively, this task design allowed us to investigate the joint
influence of two qualitatively different types of manipulations of
bias on ERPs, both of which are based on automatic processes. We
reasoned that the two manipulations might result in additive
effects on early frontal ERP correlates, with the largest (most
negative) potential in the liberal-high familiarity condition, and the
smallest (least negative) potential in the conservative-low familiar-
ity condition.
Materials and Methods Experiment 3
Participants. Data were obtained from 35 participants
(students) who participated for course credit or a monetary reward
of 20 Euro. All participants were healthy native German speakers
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave signed
informed consent before participating in the experiment. Data of
eight participants had to be excluded due to an insufficient
number of hits in at least one condition (conservative, low
familiarity) for ERP analysis which led to noisy data. Another
participant was excluded due to excessive eye blink artefacts which
could not be corrected. Thus, the final sample size was 26 (19
females). The mean age was 22.1 years (range 19–34), and 24
participants were right-handed.
Figure 7. Mean ERP amplitudes taken in early (300–500 ms poststimulus) and late (500–700 ms poststimulus) time-windows at
frontal (Fz, AFz, AF3, AF4, F1, F2, FCz) and parietal (see insert in Figure 6) sites in Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g007
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Stimuli and stimulation sequences. Word stimuli and list
construction were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. To induce
familiarity by preexposure, half of the old and half of the new test
items were presented twice in a prior reading task performed
before the recognition memory task. Four lists for the liberal
condition and four lists for the conservative condition were
created. Each list contained a study block of 40 words and a
recognition block of 80 words. These 80 words were assigned
equally to the following conditions (i) old-high familiarity (studied
items with preexposure). (ii) old-low familiarity (studied items
without preexposure). (iii) new-high familiarity (unstudied items
with preexposure), (iv) new-low familiarity (unstudied items
without preexposure).
Experimental procedure. Participants were fully informed
before the experiment about the task design, and were warned that
words from the reading task (inducing familiarity via preexposure)
would later serve as test probes in the recognition memory task. In
the reading task itself, 160 words were presented twice in
randomized order for 400 ms and an ISI of 1400 ms; half of
these were later ‘‘old’’ items in the recognition test and the others
‘‘new’’. Participants were instructed to press the left mouse button
when they detected that an item was presented for the second time
to ensure continuous attention. After the reading task, the study
phase was run, followed by the recognition test phase, analogue to
Experiments 1 and 2. For the recognition test, participants were
explicitly instructed to ignore whether or not they had seen a test
item in the reading task. Specifically, they were asked to render an
‘‘old’’ response only when a word had been presented in the study
phase, the same procedures as in Experiments 1 and 2. The
complete sequence (preexposure - study – memory test) was then
repeated for the other response criterion. The instructions to
respond liberal or conservative were identical to those of the
previous experiments. The experimental procedures for the study
and test phase, the EEG-recording and analyses as well as analysis
of the behavioral data was identical to the block condition of
Experiment 1.
Results Experiment 3
Behavioral data. Figure 7 displays hit rates (HR), false alarm
rates (FA), response bias Br, accurate recognition memory Pr, and
RTs in the four experimental conditions. The two-way ANOVA
of the bias measure Br revealed the expected main effects for
Criterion: F(1, 25) = 69.1, p,.001, eta2=0.73, and for Familiarity:
F(1, 25) = 64.7, p,.001, eta2=0.72, plus a Familiarity x Criterion
interaction: F(1, 25) = 9.83, p,.005, eta2=0.28; due to larger
effects of familiarity in the liberal relative to the conservative
condition. Only one participant in one condition (low familiarity)
did not shift his/her bias in accord with the instructions; this
participant was maintained as it had practically no effect on
results.
Analysis of accurate old/new recognition memory Pr revealed
only a significant interaction of Familiarity x Criterion: F(1,
25) = 11.6, p,.003, eta2=0.32, showing reduced accuracy for
high familiarity items in the liberal condition relative to the other
conditions, suggesting that the high familiarity condition interfered
somewhat with accurate old/new recognition when the decision
criterion was liberal. In fact, the reason for both, the high bias and
the low accuracy in this condition was the higher false alarm rate
(see Figure 7).
As in the two other experiments, Br and Pr correlated highly
(average r= .92) with SDT indices of bias and accuracy,
respectively (details in Table S1).
Mean RTs for correct responses were analyzed using an
ANOVA of the three within-subjects factors Response Type (old/
new), Criterion (liberal/conservative), and Familiarity (low/high).
A main effect of Familiarity revealed, on average, faster (18 ms)
responses for low- vs. high familiarity items: F(1, 25) = 21.1, p,
.001, eta2=0.46. Two interactions were significant: Response type
x Criterion: F(1, 25) = 25.3, p,.001, eta2=0.5, and Response type
x Familiarity: F(1, 25) = 86.3, p,.001, eta2=0.78. As Figure 7
shows, the main reason for the faster responses in the low
familiarity condition was the high RTs to new items in the high
familiarity condition where the expected memory intrusions
occurred. Conversely, new items in the low familiarity conditions
were distinctly new compared to all other conditions and were
therefore easily identified, which is why responses to these items
were fastest.
ERP data. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the grand average
waveform showed a frontocentral negativity peaking around
320 ms with a maximum at FCz (FN320). In the low familiarity
condition that reflects a standard old/new recognition memory
task, this component was smaller (more positive) in the conserva-
tive compared to the liberal condition, and larger for new than for
old items. In the high familiarity condition with the bottom-up
increased bias, no such differentiation could be observed
(Figure 8).
An ANOVA (mean amplitude 300–350 ms poststimulus) was
performed with the within-subjects factors Old/New, Criterion
(liberal, conservative), Familiarity (High, Low), and the seven
electrode sites (FCz and the surrounding sites Fz, Cz, F1, F2, FC1,
FC2). Apart from a significant old/new effect, F(1, 25) = 4,46, p,
.05, eta2=0.15, the analysis showed that the interaction of
Criterion x Familiarity was marginally significant, F(1, 25) = 3.31,
p= .08, eta2=0.12, and so was the four-way interaction with
electrode site: F(6, 150) = 2.07, p,.10. eta2=0.08. More detailed
inspection suggested that main effects of bias were evident only at
electrode sites Fz and FCz in the low familiarity condition. An
ANOVA restricted to FCz, where the effect of bias was largest,
indeed revealed a significant interaction of Criterion x Familiarity:
F(1, 25) = 8.33, p,.01. eta2=0.25, in addition to a significant
effect of Old/New: F(1, 25) = 4.98, p,.035, eta2=0.17. The post
hoc test revealed a significant difference in the FN320 amplitude
(liberal more negative than conservative) in the low familiarity
condition that was absent in the high familiarity condition
(Figure 9). Thus, the marginal effects described for the entire
ROI turned out significant when only the center of the ROI was
considered, and was due to a significant effect of bias on the
FN320 in the low familiarity condition only. The grand average
depicted in Figure 9 shows that this ERP difference (conservative
more positive than liberal for both, old and new items) maintained
apparent until about 450 ms poststimulus.
In the standard ERP analyses (detailed in Tables 1 and 2), the
early time-window (300–500 ms poststimulus) revealed only
significant old/new effects at both, frontal and parietal sites.
However, ERPs from the late time-window (500–700 ms post-
stimulus) showed, first, a significant main effect of bias at frontal
sites as potentials were more positive in the conservative condition
relative to liberal, and second, significant interactions of criterion
with old/new effects at both frontal and parietal sites; in both these
cases, old/new differences were larger for the conservative
condition relative to liberal (see Figure 10).
Discussion Experiment 3
Familiarity of the recognition test materials was manipulated via
preexposure to induce a memory retrieval bias that would interact
with early effects of instructed decision bias expected to manifest in
frontal ERPs. In the behavioral responses, we found, as expected,
shifts of the decision criterion as a function of both, instruction and
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familiarity. Items that had been presented before the recognition
memory task were more ‘‘fluent’’ due to the repetition and
therefore retrieved more automatically [38,48–50]. As expected,
this led to more ‘‘old’’ responses in response to both, old and new
test items, thereby increasing the response bias (i.e., rendering the
criterion for ‘‘old’’ responses more liberal). In addition, behavioral
data showed that participants set and maintained their response
criterion in accordance with the bias instructions. Hence their
response criterion on every single trial was jointly determined by a
tonic (blockwise by instruction) and a phasic (trialwise by
familiarity) component. By contrast, and in contrast to Experiment
2, accurate old/new recognition was largely unaffected by these
manipulations.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, early ERP indices of instructed bias
effects were found in the FN320, but this time only in the low
familiarity condition which reflects the standard old/new recog-
nition memory test condition. However, even here, effects were
weaker than in the other two experiments as they became only
marginally significant for the entire frontocentral cluster, and
significant only at the central frontal site (FCz). In the high
familiarity condition, effects involving bias were far from
significant (p..90). This high familiarity condition is the one
where subject-driven and stimulus-driven bias effects were
expected to mix (or add up), and participants had to carefully
monitor the true source of any ‘‘oldness’’ feelings while being
tempted to mistakenly classify new items as ‘‘old’’ [37]. Perhaps
these circumstances have diminished the ERP correlates of bias in
the FN320, and at the same time slowed down responses. This
interpretation is consistent with traces of familiarity effects visible
at frontal and frontocentral sites in the T-maps between 200 and
500 ms poststimulus (Figure S2). However, since none of the
planned statistical analyses proved any early effects of familiarity to
be significant, these interpretations are speculative.
The standard analyses of ERPs in the late time-window showed
a significant main effect of bias at frontal sites; again more
positivity was associated with the conservative criterion. However,
contrary to the finding in the FN320, this pattern was driven by
enhanced positivity associated with old items only, which led to
larger old/new differences in the conservative as compared to the
liberal condition, so the main effect was secondary to the
interaction. Larger old/new differences in the conservative
condition compared to liberal were also found at parietal sites in
this late time-window (see Figure 10). These findings are consistent
with Experiments 1 and 2.
General Discussion
The present study aimed at characterizing and specifying the
effects of criterion-setting functions on ERPs recorded during
recognition memory tasks. Based on prior studies [34–37], we
hypothesized early frontal ERPs to be sensitive to bias effects. Our
goal was to examine how sensitive, specific, and consistent across
various task contexts the bias would be reflected in these
correlates, and how criterion setting would interact with early
and late accurate memory retrieval as indexed by standard ERP
indices of recognition memory processes.
We performed three recognition memory experiments in which
response criteria were manipulated within participants via
instructions. Additionally, one other factor was varied in each
experiment that was meant to challenge criterion-setting functions.
In Experiment 1, this was the flexible trialwise shift of criterion-
setting, in Experiment 2, the increased memory strength of studied
items, and in Experiment 3, the induction of automatic retrieval
bias by familiarity. In all three experiments, behavioral data
indicated that our manipulations led to the expected effects,
including longer reaction times for the trialwise criterion-shifts in
Experiment 1, shorter reaction times for stronger memory traces
in Experiment 2, and longer reaction times for source conflict
resolution in Experiment 3.
ERP analyses of the three experiments yielded two central
findings: the correlates of bias itself (main effects of bias) and the
interaction of bias effects with old/new effects.
Main effects of bias on ERPs
We found the FN320 to reflect instructed bias effects across all
three experiments (with the exception of the high familiarity
condition of Experiment 3). The component was consistently more
Figure 8. Hitrates (HR) and False Alarm Rates (FAR, top), Bias Br
and Accurate Old/New Recognition Pr (center), and RTs
(bottom) for Experiment 3 (error bars display standard errors).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g008
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positive for the conservative response criterion relative to liberal,
i.e., when the trials involved in the ERP average contained
relatively more sure ‘‘old’’ judgments. This ERP difference
between conservative and liberal conditions had a frontocentral
focus, and was temporally circumscribed to 300–350 ms in
Experiments 1 and 3 (where in fact it occurred only in the low
familiarity condition). In Experiment 2, where memory strength
was varied in addition to decision criterion, and old/new
discrimination was relatively easy (as shown by reaction times
and accuracy), the difference lasted longer, until about 500 ms
poststimulus for old items and about 450 ms for new items. Owing
to this temporal variation, and to the markedly reduced effects
seen in Experiment 3, we suggest that the FN320 is no ‘‘universal’’
marker of decision bias, but might mark the onset of criterion-
setting processes, when these precede other task-related processes
and are therefore relatively independent of task context.
Main effects of bias were less clear in Experiment 3, where
significant effects of bias were spatially very focused, and emerged
only at the peak of the FN320 in the low familiarity condition. As
high and low familiarity items were randomly mixed, the
recognition memory task in this experiment may have been more
challenging than in the other two experiments. Specifically,
automatic effects of induced familiarity, i.e., effects of retrieval
bias, may have distorted and delayed the setting and maintenance
of the decision criterion in this task context. In fact, standard ERP
analyses failed to find any statistically reliable effects of bias in the
early time-window.
Consistent with [37], any main effects of bias observed in the
three experiments were consistently characterized by higher ERP
positivity in the conservative condition compared to liberal at the
frontal sites investigated, as should be expected if the decision
threshold relates to a higher point of familiarity on the memory
strength dimension (c.f., Figure 1). However, this result is
inconsistent with [36] who reported the opposite pattern (higher
positivity associated with liberal bias) for frontopolar sites,
alongside larger early old/new effects for the conservative
condition relative to liberal. The inconsistency is probably not
only due to the different referencing (although different referenc-
ing alone can convert ERP differences at frontopolar and other
inferior sites; c.f., note 4 on page 485 in [33]), but also to
Figure 9. Frontocentral (site FCz) grand average ERPs for high familiarity items (left) and the low familiarity items (right) of
Experiment 3. The FN320 was larger (more negative) for the liberal than for the conservative decision criterion only in the low familiarity condition.
In the later time window around 600 ms poststimulus, the ERP old/new differences were larger in the conservative condition than in the liberal
condition. BOTTOM: Parietal grand average ERPs for the low familiarity (left) and the high familiarity condition (right) of Experiment 3. The parietal
waveform was averaged across the seven sites included in the statistical analysis (see insert).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g009
FN320 and Decision Bias
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 15 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e106411
differences in the design of the comparisons. Specifically, in the
study by [36], comparisons were made between individuals
whereas in the present study (and in [37]), the bias was varied
within individuals. That is, the criterion was determined by
explicit instructions, and was not allowed to be set freely in accord
with individual preferences. This might change the ERP
correlates, because participants naturally tending towards a liberal
bias are pressed to respond conservatively in the conservative
condition, and participants naturally preferring a conservative bias
are pressed to respond liberally in the liberal condition; in fact, all
participants are prompted to shift their criteria in both bias
conditions, thereby overruling their natural response tendencies.
Notably, the frontopolar ERP correlates of free-floating bias
observed in the prior study [36] varied immensely between high
and low bias participants, and not just around 300–500 ms
poststimulus, but across the entire recording epoch, even in N1,
and likewise post decision, so that these possibly reflect general
differences between individuals, and may be entirely unrelated to
stimulus processing. Nonetheless, ERP correlates of bias may differ
for between- and within-participant comparisons. At the moment,
we solely refer to within-participant shifts of bias in suggesting that
the FN320 might index initial criterion setting processes when the
criterion is deliberately adapted to explicit task conditions (as
opposed to stimulus-controlled or trait-controlled).
Interaction effects of bias with ERP old/new effects
The second main finding of our study refers to interactions of
ERP correlates of bias with ERP old/new effects. Whereas the
above discussed bias effects on the FN320 and on frontal ERPs
during the early time-window reflect main effects (‘‘ERP
conservative/liberal effects’’, so to speak), without any significant
impact on ERP old/new differences, we also found consistent
evidence of interactions of bias with ERP old/new effects, across
all three experiments. The main characteristic was that old/new
differences were larger in the conservative relative to the liberal
bias conditions, in line with earlier reports [34–37]. However,
these interactions occurred later than the main effects of bias, so
that they became significant only in the late time-window of the
standard analyses. Depending on experiment, these interaction
effects were significant at frontal (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and
parietal sites (Experiment 3), with parietal sites additionally
showing other task effects (Experiments 1 and 2).
The temporal characteristic of the interactions of criterion with
old/new item status suggests that the effects are related to
controlled processes, not to ‘‘quick and dirty’’ automatic memory
effects like familiarity. In addition to controlled memory retrieval
[39], response monitoring processes could be involved that are
typically associated with variations in late frontal ERPs [52]. In
any case, the finding of larger old/new ERP differences for
conservative compared to liberal criteria is not in line with SDT
and 2 HTM ([1–3,26], which both assume independence of bias
Figure 10. Mean ERP amplitudes taken in early (300–500 ms poststimulus) and late (500–700 ms poststimulus) time-windows at
frontal (Fz, AFz, AF3, AF4, F1, F2, FCz) and parietal (see insert in Figure 9) sites in Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106411.g010
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and accuracy. Despite the parallels of this finding in prior studies
[35–37], this theoretical implication has not been discussed before.
If old/new discrimination and bias were independent processes,
then their brain correlates should not show any significant
interactions. Perhaps the finding points to the limits of single
process memory models as compared to dual process models:
Whereas the former assume a single familiarity dimension
underlying all memory signals, the latter propose a separate
processing mode for episodic recollection, one that is quantita-
tively different in terms of latency and decision confidence, and
qualitatively different in terms of neuronal basis and subjective
experience (for a review, see [53]). Our ERP findings suggest that,
when participants make old/new distinctions at relatively high
levels of familiarity, as is the case in the conservative condition
more so than in the liberal, they show more late recollection of
studied item information (Experiment 3, frontal and parietal late
ERPs), more sensitivity to the memory strength of test items
(Experiment 2, frontal late ERPs), and higher capability to
maintain positive old/new differences (Experiment 1, late frontal).
This shows clearly that the conservative and the liberal thresholds
are not equivalently operating regimes, but have different
influences on memory retrieval processes, presumably because
more recollection is involved in the conservative condition relative
to liberal. In addition, the incidental finding of a longer duration of
bias effects for old items relative to new items in Experiment 2 is
not consistent with 2 HTM which assumes that old and new item
recognition thresholds are equivalent. These theoretical implica-
tions need further investigation, preferably with ERPs because
two-choice behavioral indices might be unable to show the
distinctions outlined here.
Study limitations
The designs of the experiments reported in this article are rather
complex, investigating the effects of three experimental factors
(Criterion, Old/New, one additional task design factor), plus
Experiment (1 through 3) as an additional factor, on various
electrode sites and time-windows. The complexity was necessary to
compare effects of instructed bias in the three different memory
task contexts on the relevant ERP correlates. However, future
studies could limit their designs to classical manipulations of bias,
e.g., by instructions, pay-off matrices, or by investigating
individual differences, to focus on main effects of bias, before
applying these indices to other contexts and interactions. Of
particular interest would be the question of whether the FN320 is
indeed specific to subject-driven variations of bias as opposed to
bottom-up, input driven variations, as speculated here.
Another potential limitation of our study is that we could not
provide a direct link between variations in behavioral indices of
bias and the FN320. At first blush, one would expect any brain
correlate of bias to be correlated with the behavioral index of that
same cognitive function. In the present study, we did find a
significant covariation of FN320 with Br in Experiment 1 when all
participants were reconsidered (including the eight participants
that were excluded from the main analysis as they had not
complied with the bias instructions), but not in the other two
experiments where no such cases occurred. Hence, limited
variance may be one explanation for the lacking covariation.
Remarkably, however, correlations between ERP measures and
behavioral performance are almost never reported in the
recognition memory literature, in sharp contrast to the functional
magnetic imaging literature where such analyses are standard.
One reason may lie in the very high individual variability of ERP
average waveforms; ERP components are known to vary
considerably in size between individuals. Experimental effects
might covary with the individual size of the ERP components,
such that large amplitudes may be prone to larger experimental
effects, in which case the ERP indices could be entirely
uncorrelated with behavior. The issue is certainly worth systematic
and extensive investigation, but beyond the scope of this report.
Summary and conclusions
What does our results pattern mean for the dynamics of
recognition memory judgments? We suggest that, during any
ordinary recognition memory trial (one that only asks for quick
identification of old items), initially a threshold is activated for
‘‘old’’ responses at or around 300 ms poststimulus, that is reflected
in the FN320, and that is then compared with retrieved memory
signals. If the retrieved memory information exceeds the threshold,
an ‘‘old’’ response is rendered; if it falls short of the threshold, a
‘‘new’’ judgment is rendered. The equivalent happens when new
items are defined as the target. For items with a relatively large
distance to the decision threshold, the decision can be made easily;
for other items whose familiarity lies relatively close at the decision
threshold, the decision requires more controlled analysis. We
suggest that it is these latter processes that drive interactions of
ERP conservative/liberal differences with ERP old/new differ-
ences as these occur late during the recording epoch.
The idea of criterion setting as one of the first processes taking
place, even before any controlled memory retrieval sets in, may be
surprising to researchers who implicitly or explicitly understand
criterion setting as a metacognitive process that is performed if and
only if (i.e., only after) accurate memory retrieval fails [51], in line
with the decision tree depicted for 2 HTM in Figure 1. However,
the proposal fits well, first, with prior data [34–37], and second,
with the general idea that the brain routinely enacts preparatory
sets to be able to respond quickly in case of uncertainty, ambiguity,
and conflict [54,55], as proposed for instance by the memory
prediction framework [56]. According to our data, the criterion
activation occurs as early as 300 ms poststimulus, quite indepen-
dent of memory task requirements (with the exception of a
criterion that is additionally controlled by stimulus-driven retrieval
bias; as in the high familiarity condition of Experiment 3). This is
before or coincident with the onset of implicit memory retrieval
[32,57], and is integrated after 500 ms poststimulus with retrieved
memory information and other task requirements. The latter
processes may involve executive control like task switching [58–
60], as in Experiment 1, or source retrieval [61], as in Experiment
2.
Does the setting of the threshold itself require top-down
executive control? We think that it does to the degree that the
setting of the threshold relates to a hitherto unpracticed process in
the service of goal-attainment. However, once the setting of the
threshold becomes automatized, as in the block conditions of our
experiments, executive control is no longer needed. Likewise, in
comparisons between individuals freely setting their response
thresholds (i.e., comparisons of individuals who habitually show
reduced cognitive control (e.g., individuals high in impulsivity)
with those who habitually show high cognitive control), for as long
as both groups of individuals are not required to adjust their
decision thresholds flexibly in line with current task demands, the
threshold-setting process should be an automatic process that does
not require any extra intervention by executive control. In fact, in
this case the process might be better referred to as ‘‘criterion
retrieval’’ or ‘‘criterion activation’’ as it does not involve any
selection, definition, or evaluation of a criterion, but only its
activation on a given trial. According to our understanding, this
still reflects a gating function, a function with an early onset that
determines the ease by which retrieved item information is
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transformed into a particular behavioral response, and that is
subject to executive control only when strategic adjustments are
required to pursue current goals.
Further research must clarify how ‘‘universal’’ early effects of
bias on frontal ERPs are, especially under conditions of added
retrieval bias (Experiment 3). Quite possibly, the correlate might
occur later or temporally less circumscribed when criterion setting
is influenced (‘‘biased’’) by stimulus-driven information. In fact,
[51] found response bias (manipulated via payoff matrices) to be
reflected not in early, but in late parietal and even postresponse
ERPs, and interpreted these as metacognitive processes rather
than as an early ‘‘gating function’’ as we do. In that study, the to-
be-adopted bias was not known a priori by participants but had to
be extracted from payoff-matrices, and therefore was not top-
down controlled, or at least not initially. Likewise, we think that
highly speeded tasks might yield an ERP correlate of bias that
occurs even earlier than 300 ms poststimulus (e.g., 11, [62]).
In sum, we conclude that ERP conservative/liberal differences
can and should be used to track response criterion setting in
standard recognition memory tasks. At the least, they can be used
to determine bias as a potential confound in ERP investigations of
memory processes, particularly when source monitoring or
familiarity is involved, as these processes affect potentials with
similar temporal and spatial distributions [63,64]. In addition,
ERP indices of bias might stimulate research that helps clarifying
ongoing discussions about proper modeling of memory decisions
[16–25]. Contrary to behavioral indices, ERPs are free of
statistical or theoretical assumptions and sensitive to the timing
of the underlying cognitive processes, and can therefore help to
decide between alternative accounts of memory phenomena such
as false memories [15], the revelation effect [65], or list strength
effects [39].
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Statistical difference maps (t-values) of ERPs
recorded in Experiment 1 for comparisons of old versus
new items (Old/New), liberal versus conservative
criterion (Lib/Con), random versus block conditions
(Rnd/Block), and the two- and three way interactions of
these differences. Interaction effects were determined as
differences between differences, and then tested against zero.
Mean t-values of the sample-by-sample t-test were calculated for
the time-windows specified at the bottom. For a better illustration
of the significant effects the scaling was set to 22/+2 (corre-
sponding to a t-value of approximately p= .05, uncorrected for
multiple testing).
(TIF)
Figure S2 Statistical difference maps (t-values) of ERPs
recorded in Experiment 2 for comparisons of old versus
new items (Old/New), liberal versus conservative
criterion (Lib/Con), highly familiar old items versus
lowly familiar old items (Familiarity Old Items), and the
two-way interactions of these differences.Mean t-values of
the sample-by-sample t-test were calculated for the time-windows
specified at the bottom. For a better illustration of the significant
effects, the scaling was set to 22/+2 (corresponding to a t-value of
approximately p= .05, uncorrected for multiple testing).
(TIF)
Figure S3 Statistical difference maps (t-values) of ERPs
recorded in Experiment 3 for comparisons of old versus
new items (Old/New), liberal versus conservative
criterion (Lib/Con), highly familiar items versus lowly
familiar items (Familiarity), and the two- and three way
interactions of these differences. Mean t-values of the
sample-by-sample t-Test were calculated for the time-windows
specified at the bottom. For a better illustration of the significant
effects the scaling was set to 22/+2 (corresponding to a t-value of
approximately p= .05, uncorrected for multiple testing).
(TIF)
Figure S4 Mean ERP amplitudes (time-window 300–
350 ms poststimulus) of the frontocentral negativity
(FN320) in Experiment 1 shown separately for N=24
participants who varied their decision criterion in
accordance with instructions (good performers) and
N=8 subjects who did not comply with the instructions
(poor performers) in at least one of the experimental
conditions. An ANOVA with the between-subjects factor Group
and the repeated measures factors Electrode Site, Block (block/
random), Criterion (liberal/conservative), and Old/New revealed
the following significant effects: First, an interaction of Old/New x
Block: F(1, 30) = 9.15, p=0.0051, eta2=0.23 yielding old . new
differences in the random condition that were reversed in the
block condition, and secondly, an interaction of Group x
Criterion: F(1, 30) = 20.68, p,0.0001, eta2=0.41, indicating a
larger FN320 bias effect (liberal more negative than conservative)
for the good performers that was reversed in the group of poor
performers.
(TIF)
Table S1 Pearson’s correlations of behavioral indices of
Two-High-Threshold Model with indices of parametric
and nonparametric Signal Detection Theory (SDT).
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